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In order to answer the question contained in this title, it will of course be necessary 
firstly to try and ascertain what music is. This, of course, will be a very difficult task, 
for in its most absolute sense, music, as understood by Deleuze, in a move consonant 
with his entire philosophical project, is, strictly speaking, nothing, or, rather, the last 
thing it could be is nothing. Instead, music is a haecceity, which is to say that, like ‘a 
season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date’, it is a becoming, a certain kind of affect 
at differing degrees of intensity, it is a ‘this-ness’, not a thing or substance or subject 
but a mode of individuation that has ‘a perfect individuality lacking nothing’ and that 
consists ‘entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, 
capacities to affect and be affected’ ((Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 261).1 This 
description, which ostensibly traces the outline of a haecceity, exhibits a transparent 
relation to music in the most banal sense of this term, for music consists entirely of 
notes (the particles of music) and rests which draw relations of movement and rest 
between melody and rhythm, voice and instrument, instrument and instrument, 
harmony and dissonance, sound and silence, whilst music is commonly considered to 
be the art form most capable of affect at the same time as the apparent fixity of the 
musical composition — with its sacrosanct inscription as a score — has always and 
necessarily been more open to interpretation that other artistic expressions, never 
more so than in the era of the cover version and remix culture.  
 
 This pseudo-definition only tells us what music is as an event, however, it tells 
us little about the essential ontology of music, of how music comes into be(com)ing in 
the first place. And yet perhaps it tells us everything since for Deleuze becoming is 
everything, constituting an absolute outside that encompasses all that take places 
within it at the same time as it is inseparable from these events. Everything, then, is 
situated on and springs from a plane of consistency, otherwise known as a plane of 
desire (for it is necessarily productive) or a plane of immanence because becoming is 
nothing but immanence. Explaining how this reversal of Platonism does away with a 
stable foundation of being, Claire Colebrook writes, ‘the supposed real world that 
would lie behind the flux of becoming is not, Deleuze insists, a stable world of being; 
there “is” nothing other than the flow of becoming. All “beings” are just relatively 
stable moments in a flow of becoming-life’ (Colebrook 2001: 125). 
 
 The problem for most philosophical or artistic expressions, according to 
Deleuze, is that this plane of immanence can be conceptualised in two different ways. 
On the one hand, as he writes,  
 
The plane can be a hidden principle, which makes visible what is seen and audible 
what is heard, etc., which at every instant causes the given to be given, in this or that 
state, at this or that moment. But the plane itself is not given. It is by nature hidden. It 
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can only be inferred, induced, concluded from that to which it gives rise. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 265) 
 
Conceiving of the plane in this way, the relatively stable moments of the flow of 
becoming-life appear to be individuations, the enfolding of their aleatory outside 
being perceived as a finalised process resulting in an individuated entity and a 
perception of them as fixed forms separate from the (now transcendent) plane which 
exists, therefore, ‘only in a supplementary dimension to that to which it gives rise’. As 
Deleuze suggests, ‘the plan(e), conceived or made in this fashion, always concerns the 
development of forms and the formation of subjects’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
265). 
 
 ‘Then there is an altogether different conception of the plane’, Deleuze 
continues,  
 
or an altogether different conception of the plane. Here, there are no longer any forms 
or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects. There 
is no structure, any more than there is genesis. There are only relations of movement 
and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between 
elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 266) 
 
To a certain extent, these two kinds of planes always exist together, for even though 
the latter is ‘the plane of Nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 266), ‘one continually 
passes from one to the other, by unnoticeable degrees and without being aware of it, 
or one becomes aware of it only afterward. Because one continually reconstitutes one 
plane atop another, or extricates one from the other’(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 269). 
This is possible, for Deleuze, since if one does not allow the plane of immanence ‘to 
play freely on the surface’ but instead allows it to become deeply rooted in Nature, it 
suddenly appears to serve as a ground, a principle of organization that stands in a 
transcendent relation to all that takes place upon it (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 269). 
Whilst the plane of immanence is more ‘natural’, then, ‘the plane of organization is 
constantly working away at the plane of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of 
flight, stop or interrupt the movements of deterritorialization, weigh them down, 
restratify them, reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth’ at the same 
time as, conversely, ‘the plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the 
plane of organization, causing particles to spin off the strata, scrambling forms by dint 
of speed or slowness, breaking down functions by means of assemblages or 
microassemblages’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270). These two planes thus serve as 
two abstract poles which draw differing degrees of intensity towards themselves. 
Judging by the above suggestion that music is a haecceity, it might be thought that 
music would be drawn, more often than not, towards the latter pole, that it would arise 
from the plane of immanence which is constituted by relations of movement and rest. 
Indeed, Deleuze calls this plane ‘which knows only longitudes and latitudes, speeds 
and haecceities, the plane of consistency or composition’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
266; my italics), a name which, once again, would seem to infer a certain kinship to 
music. Such, however, is not the case, for in order for music to come into perception it 
would appear that a separation is effectuated between the plane and that to which it 
gives rise. Indeed, Deleuze explicitly states that ‘the developmental or organizational 
principle [of music] does not appear in itself, in a direct relation with that which is 
developed or is organized: There is a transcendent compositional principle that is not 
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of the nature of sound, that is not “audible” by itself or for itself’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 266). 
 
 This is not the case for all music, indeed, Deleuze suggests that ‘to the 
transcendent, organizational plane of Western music based on sound forms and their 
development, we [should] oppose the immanent plane of consistency of Eastern 
music, composed of speeds and slownesses, movements and rest’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 270). Nor is this attraction of Western music towards the plane of 
organisation an absolute principle; as Deleuze writes, ‘certain modern musicians 
oppose the transcendent plan(e) of organization […] to the immanent sound plane’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 267). Nonetheless, it is the transcendent plane of 
organization which, according to Deleuze, ‘is said to have dominated all of Western 
classical music’ and that, it can be added, continues to dominate nearly all forms and 
genres of Western music (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 267). This is to say that even 
when Western music is embarked upon a process of involution ‘in which form is 
constantly being dissolved’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 267), there is nearly always a 
concomitant development of form that draws Western music towards a plane of 
organization (see Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270). This may be due, in part, to 
Western music’s reliance on a regular, pulsed metre that grounds it in ‘Chronos: the 
time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a 
subject’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 262); it may be linked to the dominance of “pre-
composed” forms as opposed to improvisational performance compositions (an 
opposition which finds an analogous series in the pre-recorded vs. live binary of many 
contemporary popular musical forms); it may, as Deleuze suggests, have to do with 
music’s relationship to the refrain (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300). What matters 
most in the final analysis, however, is that the perceptible (which is to say audible) 
forms of Western music, which as a virtual entity on an ideational level of intensity 
appears to be a haecceity, are consistently pulled towards a plane of transcendence 
and music is thereby imbued with a double and contradictory movement.  
 
 It is this movement that for Deleuze constitutes the very essence of music 
whose content, according to a passage in A Thousand Plateaus, is ‘the refrain itself’, 
yet which is described in this same page as ‘a creative, active operation that consists 
in deterritorialising the refrain’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300). As he elaborates, 
‘whereas the refrain is essentially territorial, territorializing, or reterritorializing, 
music makes it a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing form of expression’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300). In a nutshell, ‘what musicians do should be 
musical’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300), which is to say that whilst music makes 
use of the refrain, a type of sonic organization which is often used by animals in order 
to provide an aural barrier that extends their physical presence, warning off 
competitors, it is not the objective of music to stake out a territory, to create an 
enclave shut off from the outside but, on the contrary, to affect as do the colours of a 
coral fish and birdsong, to deploy attributes intended to attract not repel (see Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 316-17). Whilst the coming into perception of Western music 
would appear in most cases to be dependent on a transcendent plane which can only 
produce fixed forms and not becomings, then, its power of affects, its musicality it 
might be said, comes from a properly musical process that consists in dismantling 
those very forms, pushing them to their limit, submitting them to the diagonal or 
transversal as music reterritorialises upon itself qua music (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 303). Thus, ‘the whole becoming of Western music, all musical becoming, 
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implies a minimum of sound forms and even of melodic and harmonic functions’, but 
given this, ‘speeds and slownesses are made to pass across them, and it is precisely 
these speeds and slownesses that reduce the forms and functions to the minimum’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270). It is a question, then, of ‘a material proliferation 
that goes hand in hand with a dissolution of form (involution) but [which is] at the 
same time accompanied by a continuous development of form’, as Deleuze writes 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270). Western music, whilst dependent on the creation of 
forms, only becomes music through the undoing of those forms and this double 
movement is music’s very ground of possibility and its salvation, it is what enables it 
to form a block of expression and yet remain musical. This, then, is what music is, but 
is this what pop is? 
 
 Here again a problem is encountered because the very definition of pop music 
is a contentious issue on which, it would seem, there can be no absolute consensus. 
For Ian Buchanan, pop is merely a codeword for the populism inherent in the refrain, 
it is that which allows us a return ‘home’, and as such a pre-requisite of pop is the 
inclusion of a refrain, ‘a tune that sticks in your head and can be easily whistled or 
hummed’, as he says (Buchanan 2000: 184). According to this definition, pop would 
indeed appear to be music, in fact one might say that it is a kind of ur-music since it is 
even more dependent on the territoriality of the refrain than other musical forms. To 
believe this, however, would be to forget, as Buchanan reminds us, that for Deleuze 
and Guattari ‘the refrain is not music, it is rather “the block of content proper to 
music”’ (Buchanan 2000: 184, quoting Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 299). Indeed, even 
though music exists only ‘because the refrain exists also, because music takes up the 
refrain, lays hold of it as a content in a form of expression, because it forms a block 
with it in order to take it somewhere else’, the refrain is ultimately ‘a means of 
preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 300). 
Whilst an analysis of pop’s relationship to the refrain would appear to suggest that 
pop is not music, then, this analysis does not in the end allow us to differentiate pop 
from other musical forms and cannot then serve to define what pop is.  
 
In their essay ‘What I Hear Is Thinking Too: Deleuze and Guattari Go Pop’, 
Timothy Murphy and Daniel Smith take a different approach and define pop as:  
 
the regime of music production that is tied neither to the European composer / 
concert tradition and its strict division of labor, nor to any of the various historical 
traditions of indigenous music making around the world, but rather to the bricolage 
of modern recording technology (electric / electronic instruments, studios, 
overdubbing, mixing, etc.) and its media of distribution. (Murphy and Smith 2001: 
para 2)  
 
This definition of pop, whilst retaining the standard Classical (read serious) vs. pop 
(read frivolous) division adds another dimension to the argument, for it suggests that 
pop is in fact opposed to both European Classical and indigenous musical traditions, 
which is to say traditions that are constructed according to an entirely different set of 
principles, or even on a different plane — indeed, does Deleuze not oppose ‘the 
transcendent, organizational plane of Western music based on sound forms and their 
development [to] the immanent plane of consistency of Eastern music, composed of 
speeds and slownesses, movements and rest’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270)? What 
is more, in tying their definition of pop to its modes of production and distribution, 
Smith and Murphy might be said to overcome the very binary opposition that they 
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establish, since many of the traditional modes they oppose to pop have altered their 
modus operandi to utilise the bricolage of modern recording technology and 
distribution so as to ensure their very survival. (We need only think of “World Music” 
compact disks and the massive proliferation of live recordings of European Classical 
works to see that this is the case.) Smith and Murphy’s definition of pop then ends up 
turning this term into little more than a porte-manteau word which can contain any 
kind of music, a phenomenon that would not appear to worry John Corbett who 
suggests that ‘all music is now popular’ since the electronic colonisation of all music 
that equates to a kind of musical imperialism involves ‘a complex treatment of the 
notion of “popularity” that cuts across three territories, blurring their boundaries [: …] 
Popular music as a statistical region [, …] Popular music as a formal genre [… and] 
Popular music as anything recorded’ (Corbett 1994: 35; emphasis in original). Such a 
move, however, is very problematic, for it implies that the same criterion can be used 
to analyse the expressions of The Spice Girls, Kenny G, Scorn and the Dillinger 
Escape Plan, and this is patently not the case. Whilst all of these “artists” could be 
classified as “popular” because of the varying levels of commercial success that they 
enjoy, there is virtually no common ground between the The Spice Girls and Kenny G 
on the one hand (whom one would assume to be familiar to most readers) and Scorn 
and the Dillinger Escape Plan on the other.2 
 
 It would be unfair completely to dismiss Smith and Murphy’s claims with 
regards to their definition of pop, however, for the answer to the question as to 
whether or not pop is music does indeed reside in the relationship of music to the 
market. Indeed, in order to arrive at an understanding of what pop in its truest sense 
is, it is necessary to intensify Ian Buchanan’s statement that popular culture is ‘more 
complexly bound to its milieu than other modes of art perhaps are’ (Buchanan 2000: 
176) and suggest that pop at its highest level of intensity is inextricably bound to its 
milieu, its plane and its territory and that, as a result, it no longer qualifies as music in 
a Deleuzian sense since the mode according to which it operates is not one in which it 
is desirable to perform the deterritorialisation of the refrain intrinsic to a properly 
musical expression.  
 
 What will here be called pop is pop at its most extreme level of intensity, pop 
as an idea and not a content of expression, much as Deleuze talks of music in its pre-
expressive state. The reason why it is necessary to retain this abstraction in a 
definition of pop is precisely because it is a term that only seems to lead to polemic or 
a complete absence of meaning when it passes into actuality through embodiment in 
pop groups or musical genres. Any discussion around this theme that gives specific 
examples seems destined to be accused of resurrecting a high / low culture debate 
and, by inference, of making subjective value judgments. This is not to say that the 
comments regarding pop herein cannot be applied to specific instances of pop, merely 
that it is necessary for this secondary application to be carried out by each individual 
reader since subjective examples can only ever be just that and hence of little use in 
an attempt to answer an ontological question imbued with a high coefficient of 
objectivity.  
 
 In the Western tradition (which is, of course, that which gave rise to pop), the 
organisational principle of music does not, according to Deleuze and Guattari, appear 
in itself but, rather, remains inaudible. Music’s audible forms relate to their plane, 
then, only as ‘a transcendent unity or hidden principle’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
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266). Such is not the case for pop in its highest form. For if pop can be said to be 
inextricably bound to its milieu, this is because, as its name suggests, it is born of a 
desire to become popular and populist and its forms of expression then take as their 
model the forms already existing within the milieu that constitute the popular. Whilst 
in Western music traditionally the plane cannot be given but only ‘inferred from the 
forms it develops and the subject it forms, since it is for these forms and these 
subjects’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 266), then, it is rather the case with pop that the 
forms exist for the plane. This is the first sense then in which pop does not conform to 
a Deleuzian conceptualisation of music, for even though Western Music 
predominantly maintains a transcendent relation to the plane from which it springs, 
that plane is nonetheless a pure musical outside whereas the outside that constitutes 
the plane from which pop is created is commercial, which is to say that it is made up 
of the axiomatics necessary to appeal to a studied demographic and thus become 
popular. Even though pop comes into being through a manipulation and organisation 
of sonic content, then, those processes are only secondary effects of its primary 
organisational principle which is dictated by market forces. There is in pop’s coming 
into expression, then, an excessive reliance on a transcendent plane or autonomous 
outside that has nothing to do with an artistic or musical becoming in which 
‘expressive qualities or matters of expression enter shifting relations with one another 
that “express” the relation of the territory they draw to the interior milieu of impulses 
and exterior milieu of circumstances’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 317; emphasis in 
original). 
 
 Whilst pop, like Western music, entertains a transcendent relation to its plane, 
then, it is not able to resist the fixed forms created on this transcendent plane as does 
music because the plane of pop is precisely one that requires new expressions 
emanating from it not to resist its pre-existing forms. The forms arising on the 
commercial plane of pop necessarily conform to an average ideal in order to be 
populist and hence part of the plane. Indeed, as Buchanan points out, there is a certain 
conformity inherent to pop that can then only be linked to the privileged status he 
accords pop’s (non-complex) refrains which are a symptom of its very populism 
(Buchanan 2000: 180). This conformity extends even to the repeated instances of the 
refrain in a true pop song which are not, then, pushed to their limit, deterritorialised or 
reterritorialised qua music but merely banal Platonic copies of an original already 
devoid of music. On this count also, then, pop is not music, an assertion entirely in 
accord with Antoine Hennion’s analysis of the formulaic nature of specific pop songs 
in his article ‘The Production of Success: An Antimusicology of the Pop Song’ 
(Hennion 1990). 
 
 This is not to say that there can be no such thing as popular music, that all 
popular music is necessarily populist, that no music that enjoys a healthy relationship 
to the market can qualify as music, that all popular music is content to produce only 
banal copies of the same and loathe to deterritorialise the refrain. Such is obviously 
not the case and one need only examine some specific examples of popular music to 
understand that the popular can strive for a properly musical expression, that it can 
perform deterritorialisations of many of the punctual structures of pop and enter into a 
becoming-music in spite of its popularity, that it is not necessarily governed by 
populist tendencies, then. 
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 On all of his albums (although to a lesser extent, perhaps, on some of the 
tracks featured on his 2001 offering, Blowback — which his official website describes 
as ‘his most open, accessible and, yes, downright commercial album in six years’, a 
fact which is explained by his return from the verge of insanity after the diagnosis and 
treatment of a disease that affected his immune system and psychological health3),  
Tricky performs rhythmic and linguistic deterritorialisations at odds with the ordered, 
predictable and punctual structures of pop — the former through the integration of 
what he has termed ‘spastic jungle’ rhythms into seemingly ordered and often sedate 
instrumentation, the latter through his minoritarian use of the English language. One 
of the most striking examples of these deterrititorialisations can be found on his 1996 
album, Pre-Millennium Tension, in the track ‘Makes me wanna die’. This track starts 
off with the main vocalist, Tricky’s former collaborator, Martina, singing the chorus, 
‘she makes me wanna die’, half way through which the bass and high-hat breakbeat 
that remain constant throughout the song kick in, shortly followed by the sparse, 
electric guitar accompaniment that develops throughout the song, almost but never 
quite echoing the movements of the vocal melodies. The punctuality of the rhythm 
section, then, establishes a grid system on which the vocals and guitar slip and slide, 
each enunciating recurrent themes which never, however, recur at the same time as 
each other and thus deny the confluence of instrumental and vocal melodies common 
in pop on both a harmonic and rhythmic plane. In Deleuzian terms, it might be said 
that the forms of the song are submitted ‘to temporal transformations, augmentations 
or diminutions, slowdowns or accelerations, which do not occur solely according to 
laws of organization or even of development’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270); 
indeed, the vocal and guitar lines, far from consolidating and concretising the 
organisation of the rhythm section (which is to say its structure, that upon which its 
form is premised) have a deterritorialising effect as they seem to warp and bend the 
regular, ordered metre of the pulsed beat.  
 
It would appear that there is in the song ‘Makes me wanna die’, then, a 
properly musical block of expression that demonstrates the double movement of 
reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation immanent to Western music. What is more, 
consonant with the suggestion posited above that music, in Deleuze’s formulation, is a 
haecceity, a system that is not fixed but, rather, a mode of individuation whose totality 
therefore cannot be given but rather remains open, constantly becoming, this song 
does not perform the expected, hermetic closure of a pop song that would fully 
individuate it, fix its form, separate it from its plane and render it transcendent. 
Rather, the ending of this track denies the listener a transcendent ending through 
resolution, the final vocal recurrence (‘how could you dare? / who do you think you 
are? / you’re insignificant / a small piece / an ism / no more no less / you try to learn 
the universe / can’t even converse in universe / you know…’) being brutally cut short 
as though the power cord had been severed, refusing both syntactic (previously, this 
lyric has continued: ‘you know it’s ironic / smokin’ hydroponic’) and melodic closure 
and leaving this final utterance to echo briefly in its own space, the apparent 
interiority of the vocal line returned to an absolute outside. 
 
 A similar phenomena can be observed in David Sylvian’s ‘Brilliant Trees’ 
from the 1984 album of the same name. This song does not (for its first section at 
least) follow a strict punctual rhythmic structure but rather the temporal contractions 
and expansions of Sylvian’s voice in its interplay with the instrumentation — in 
which the absence of a rhythm section is conspicuous. In this song, melody as well as 
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rhythm are deterritorialised. The last vocal line of the first instance of the chorus 
(‘leading my life back to the soil’) does not obey the melodic resolution it appears to 
lead to: Sylvian’s voice, instead of repeating the final note with the last word of the 
phrase, raises up a minor third, thus creating an expectation of continuation, refusing 
the closure that the refrain (which draws fixed and closed territories) should provide. 
In the second coming of the chorus, although the rhythmic qualities remain consistent, 
the melody of the vocal line undergoes a change, providing the expected resolution, 
repeating the last note of the melody, the base note of the key in which the song is 
written. However, whereas this kind of resolution would, in pop, lead to the end of the 
song, in ‘Brilliant Trees’ this resolution does not lead to a closed, hermetic end but 
serves, rather, as a bridge into the second and final section of the song in which 
Sylvian’s voice (which has acted as a complex attractor for the instrumentation up 
until this point, pulling the various instruments along in the wake of its own utterly 
contingent speeds and slownesses) is replaced by a very sparse and tribal sounding 
rhythm section which, whilst displaying a certain degree of punctuality, certainly does 
not obey the kind of regular pulsed metre that dominates the Western musical 
tradition. What is more, this rhythm section’s punctuality seems constantly to be 
pulled away from its moorings by the other instrumental lines, Sakamoto’s synthesiser 
and Hassell’s trumpet following the logic of their own individual expression and that 
of the exchange in which they are engaged, their trajectories sliding over this 
rhythmic base yet utterly unaffected by it. This meandering instrumental section 
(which occupies the last 4 minutes of the track’s 8½ minutes) eventually peters out to 
nothingness, refusing neat closure not only to the song but also, since it is the last 
track, to the entire album. 
 
 Of particular interest in Sylvian’s career for the present discussion, however, 
is the single he released following a hiatus in his solo career, for the era that produced 
Brilliant Trees, the double CD Gone to Earth (1985) and Secrets of the Beehive 
(1987) was to be followed by a period of ten years in which Sylvian would release no 
solo albums. During this period he did, however, release a five CD box set containing 
the majority of his solo work entitled Weatherbox (1989). To accompany this 
retrospective, Sylvian concurrently released a single ironically titled ‘Pop Song’ 
whose very cover art (a negativised image of a topless female) alone indicated that 
this single was not, in spite of its title, intended to signal a shift in Sylvian’s career 
from artsy maverick to corporate whore eager to cash in. ‘Pop Song’ itself is, 
similarly, very unlike the kind of song that its title might evoke and is, perhaps, one of 
the most un-melodic of Sylvian’s compositions, the music being based around 
microtones and the piano improvisations of John Taylor. The main instrumental line 
consists of a synthesiser bouncing back and forth, staccato, from an upper pedal note 
to (mostly) discordant relations: minor thirds, semitones, minor sixths and augmented 
fourths. Around this line, the other instruments follow the improvisational style of 
Taylor’s piano playing, following no external pattern, logic or architectural structure, 
no simple attractor of the kind used by pop that would reproduce a fixed form known 
in advance, the only discernible logic in the instrumental lines coming not from 
conformity to a melodic convention known in advance (as is often the case in pop) 
but, rather, from the patterns of exchange established occasionally between them, 
which is to say their relations. Meanwhile, Sylvian’s vocal line, based once more 
primarily around discordant intervals, follows its own logic and progression over all 
of this, singing of the everyday in Sylvian’s inimical and distinctly non-everyday way 
(‘Behind the iron gates / the shifts were worked in silence / Each weekend beckoned 
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like Ulysses’ sirens / And as the words were few / We’d listen to the radio / It was 
loud and irritated me so’ (Sylvian 1999: 11)), proposing a different variation with 
every verse and returning to a semi-stable centre (for there is still variation) only in 
the recurrent refrain (‘I’ll tell you I love you, like my favourite pop song’) whose 
polyvocal harmony is itself based around the kind of discordant interval entirely 
anathema to a pop song. 
 
 The démarche of Queens of the Stone Age on the track ‘You would know’ 
from their 1998 self-titled album is somewhat different. On this song — which starts 
out with the interplay of the sound of a ring-tone phone and a disjointed guitar line 
that remains constant throughout the song’s verses — jumpy, stuttering instruments 
and vocals are gradually added to build a deranged verse structure which oozes a 
sense of menace from every orifice on its holey surface. Holey space, for Deleuze, is a 
space which communicates with both smooth and striated space, ‘it is always 
connected to nomad [smooth] space, whereas it conjugates with sedentary [striated] 
space’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 415). Holey space then is described by an abstract 
line which has two different modes of liaison: it can be ‘a kind of rhizome, with its 
gaps, detours, subterranean passages, stems, openings, traits, holes, etc.’ and on the 
other side its traits of expression can be put ‘into a form or a code’, its holes made to 
resonate together, its lines of flight plugged, its connections submitted to ‘a whole 
regime of arborescent conjunctions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 415). If holey space 
has a soundtrack, it could well sound like this song which seems as though its score 
were written by an itinerant hole-punch, its traits of expression (or instrumental lines) 
desperately trying to conform to a model which appears to be absent, constantly 
striving for a pattern to emerge from its wanderings. Indeed, this verse structure 
eventually builds into a beautiful, almost sublime melodic chorus that struggles into 
life, fighting the precarious Jenga-like foundations of the verse — which is to say that 
the verse is built from the progressive yet arbitrary accumulation of elements similar 
to each other but different enough to render each either entirely independent or else a 
cornerstone of the whole. The first unveiling of the chorus is a tease, allowing only a 
glimpse of what is to come, one enunciation of the refrain, ‘You would know’, a four-
second soundbite that immediately falls away to two moans and a return to the holey 
verse structure. This then happens again, the first snatch of the chorus this time, 
however, giving way to eleven moans uttered over the instrumental backdrop of the 
verse structure, before there is a return to the chorus which is repeated again and 
again, expanded occasionally, as the instruments gradually organise themselves into a 
stable structure that locks itself ever tighter together as more layers are accumulated. 
This leads, in turn, to a solo instrumental section that develops the melodies and 
themes of the refrain, a passage that would normally act as a diversion before a return 
to the refrain proper. QOTSA do not allow us this closure, however, for at the very 
moment that the return of this refrain is sensed to be coming, a return which would 
signal the final and complete accomplishment of the chorus, the sublime moment of 
transcendent perfection, everything falls away to two single guitars playing the holey 
jumpy discordant style of the verse in a short final burst of slapstick that leaves the 
listener wanting more at the same time as it thrusts him outside of himself rather than 
enclosing him in the warm homely blanket of the refrain. 
 
 Finally, since the number of possible enumerations of exceptions to the rule 
established (namely, that pop is not music) is potentially infinite, it will be useful to 
examine the case of Björk, an artist who has known an enormous critical and 
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commercial success, who is truly popular, then. Björk deterritorialises the English 
language with her every utterance, ripping its signifiers from their syntactic chain 
with her Icelandic inflections whilst the idiosyncrasies and singularity of her musical 
vocalisations deterritorialise her songs’ refrains by rendering them unrepeatable. The 
curious paths that her vocal lines follow are the product of her own interior music,4 
not of harmonic patterns that can be objectively grasped, and in those moments when 
a more predictable harmonic line threatens to come to the surface Björk invariably 
usurps it with a primal, seemingly impossible scream or guttural howl. Take, for 
instance, the hit single ‘It’s Oh So Quiet’ off her 1995 album Post, a big band musical 
number whose perfectly orthodox choruses are consistently interrupted by a joyous 
piercing scream totally out of place in its context.  
 
 A more complete deterritorialisation of the refrain (which constitutes the 
content of music but which requires deterritorialising in order for that content to pass 
into expression as music) can be found on Homogenic’s (1997) ‘Pluto’. On this track 
— the dirty beats, rhythms created from static and other digital dysfunctions and 
distorted vocals of which deterritorialise a transcendent idyll of high-fidelity 
reproduction — the simple melodic pattern of the refrain, rather than always returning 
to the same point, is intensified through pitch progression. The first time the refrain 
occurs, the melody line is repeated four times, ending in an non-final semitone drop 
(figure 1) which leads into a stuttering rhythm section that sounds like somebody 
trying to jump start technology on a cold morning. This eventually leads back into the 
verse structure which again guides us through to the refrain where the same melody 
line reoccurs four times, ending in the same semitone drop, but then continuing from 
the pitch where the first development of the refrain leaves off (figure 2) as the 
instrumental backdrop drops away to mirror the bridge passage of technology without 
a choke. This refrain, at a second level of intensity and pitch, is itself repeated four 
times. It then ends in a semitone drop, is picked up again at the point at which the 
second level refrain leaves off and is repeated nine times at this third level of 
intensity. During this third level of intensity, the refrain is repeated so many times on 
the backdrop of looped stuttering rhythms that the music is forced into a locked 
groove that is only broken when Björk’s voice breaks the punctual pattern of the 
refrain at the end of the ninth enunciation with a new melodic variation which ends in 
a throwaway scream (figure 3) that allows the song, for a brief moment, fully to 
develop its rhythmic pulse before it slowly shudders to a halt. Even at the very point 
of death of this album’s penultimate track, however, Björk does not allow us (and 
especially those who would skip this track, one of the album’s most “difficult”) 
entirely to shut this intensity and dysfunction off for good, for the index cut that 
divides the compact disc into tracks has been made in such a way that the final track 
of the album — ‘All Is Full of Love’, a track in which can be found a haven of calm, a 
certain degree of resolution and sublime hermetic closure — begins with a fraction of 
a second of the final technological death spasm of its neighbour. 
 
It would no doubt be possible to enumerate many more examples of popular 
music which instigate a properly musical expression, but it is not necessary for these 
examples have shown some of the ways in which popular music can enter into a 
becoming-music. What these examples have also shown, however, is that the term 
“pop” is even more problematic than originally thought. For these songs, being 
properly musical, cannot of course be true pop in spite of the fact that they are 
recorded by people commonly referred to as pop artists (with the possible exception 
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of David Sylvian who — disingenuously, fully aware of the term’s problematic nature 
— applies the term “pop” to one of his own songs). Herein lies the rub, for whilst 
these artists are included within the category of what is generally termed pop because 
of their popularity, it does not follow from this that they entertain the same 
relationship to the commercial and popular plane as does pop. This is to say that the 
amusicality of pop has nothing to do with the level of commercial success that a 
particular expression enjoys but, rather, with the nature of the relationship between 
that expression and the commercial and popular plane which, in the case of pop, is 
genetic and causal. If a popular musician is content to produce an expression which is 
formulated according to the commercial plane of pop and which therefore cannot 
diverge from the forms pre-existing on that plane — for such would be to risk 
exclusion from that plane — then that expression will not be music (within a 
Deleuzian paradigm and perhaps others also) but, rather, pop. If, however, a popular 
artist chooses to create an expression which does not conform faithfully to pre-
existing forms, which does not adhere to a model known in advance but, rather, 
transforms existing models and forms so as to produce an expression both singular 
and new, then that expression will indeed be musical.  
 
Many may sense an apparent hostility towards pop in this discussion, yet any 
such hostility is not intended; whilst it has indeed been argued that pop is not music 
within a Deleuzian paradigm, this is done not so as to dismiss any further 
consideration of pop as a subject worthy of critical attention, but merely to suggest 
that from within this paradigm an attempt to analyse pop as a musical expression is 
bound to fail since pop operates according to an entirely different mode from music 
— a distinction which requires us to differentiate, therefore, between popular music 
and pop (or perhaps this should be written Pop). Pop cannot be analysed as a musical 
expression because it does not spring from a plane of desire that would necessarily be 
productive, always generative of the new — as are all art and philosophy for Deleuze 
by necessity — but, rather, from a plane which does not appear to desire difference, 
which tends only to produce conformity of varying degrees of divergence. Pop, then, 
operates in a fashion very similar to Muzak, which, similarly, is not music.  
 
Muzak is (not-)music as pure function, (not-)music which exists only as a 
means to convert the individual into consumer. Muzak is sometimes termed ‘business 
music’ since it is designed to programme on a subliminal level behavioural patterns 
within a commercial environment, be it by increasing workers’ output or increasing 
shoppers’ spending (see Gifford 1995). As Muscio, a muzak arranger, has 
commented, ‘our [Muzak’s] service actually lies in its sequential arrangement to gain 
certain effects and to serve a functional purpose’ (quoted in Lanza 1995: 155). It is 
not only in this commercial imperative that Muzak resembles the form of Pop music 
analysed above, however, for Muzak, like Pop with its homely refrains, is also 
programmed to appeal to (or, rather, not offend) the largest number of people 
possible. As Gifford writes,  
 
 Arranging a song for Muzak is like cooking for 50 people. Suzuki [a Muzak 
arranger] has to please everyone to some degree, but it’s more important that he 
offend nobody. His job is to take the edges off of songs. Vocals are removed and 
replaced by a suitably anonymous instrument, usually piano, guitar, woodwinds or 
vibes. Punchy rhythm parts are deflated a bit; distorted guitars and overly brassy 
horns are filed down. High, squeaky passages are lowered an octave, and dissonant 
chords are sweetened. (Gifford 1995) 
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 Whilst the suggestion that pop is nothing more than Muzak again may seem a 
somewhat contentious and hostile gesture, and particularly in light of this quotation 
which appears to describe the very epitome of blandness, it does find credence in the 
fact that Muzak, although its infamy is still widespread and in spite of the cheesy 
symbolic capital that its name still evokes, is, in fact, heard less and less in those 
commercial spaces where one would previously have heard (subconsciously, of 
course, for one is not supposed to hear Muzak) its piped-in anaesthetic tones. Indeed, 
in the shopping malls, supermarkets and hotel lobbies of the new millennium, one is 
far more likely to hear Pop. Rather than there being a direct functional equivalence 
between Muzak and pop, then, it is perhaps rather the case that the latter has 
superseded the former and become even less musical in the process. 
 
 Many readers will no doubt still sense in this line of argumentation a latent 
hostility towards Pop. If such exists, it is perhaps only because there sometimes 
resides a similar hostility in Deleuze’s thought where the popular, as Buchanan writes, 
is ‘the undesirable other, or, worse, an enormous homogenising machine depriving art 
of its place and value in contemporary society’ (Buchanan 2000: 175). To dismiss the 
popular in this manner, however, is to allow philosophy to be governed (and hence 
destroyed) by its enemy: opinion. If popular art forms appear to constitute somewhat 
of a stumbling block for Deleuze and for philosophy more generally, then, this is 
perhaps because philosophy has repeated the common mistake of conflating Pop and 
the popular. For as long as Pop (and this term can be extended, of course, to 
encompass other popular forms apart from pseudo-musical ones) is analysed 
according to the same set of principles articulated to artistic forms that can only 
produce the new, a sense of frustration will necessarily be felt, for they simply do not 
operate in the same manner, even when they share certain characteristics such as the 
refrain. For Deleuze, the refrain in music expresses the internal music of the 
individual which subsequently finds an auto-objectivity in its expression and 
reception when, as Deleuze writes, ‘expressive qualities or matters of expression 
enter shifting relations with one another that “express” the relation of the territory 
they draw to the interior milieu of impulses and exterior milieu of circumstances’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 317). When functioning in this manner, the expressive 
qualities of the territorialising refrain ‘are auto-objective, in other words, find an 
objectivity in the territory they draw’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 317). This can only 
happen, however, when the expression that draws the territory is an inherent 
enunciation of the individual whence issues that expression, when the territorialising 
expression is the becoming-expressive of qualities proper to the individual (see 
Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 316), when, it might be said, the music has soul. If the 
motivation behind the territorial expression of Pop issues not from an internal 
imperative but from an external imperative, an axiomatic of the strata of Capital, it 
cannot become auto-objective and will instead merely become an auxiliary of the 
apparatae of capture of the Capitalist machine.5 This does not inherently make Pop 
“better” or “worse” than a truly musical expression, but it does mean that it needs to 
be analysed according to its own immanent terms, for such is the guiding or founding 
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1 For the sake of readability, we shall refer to Deleuze even when the ideas discussed can be found in a 
work co-authored with Félix Guattari.  
2 Scorn is the result of the illogical career progression of Mick Harris from drummer in überthrash 
metal outfit Napalm Death to post-industrial grindcore merchant in the band Scorn to king of dark 
ambient dub in Scorn the one-man outfit. The Dillinger Escape Plan meanwhile is an extreme hardcore 
unit from New York heavily influenced by free jazz structures and rhythms and whose sound can only 
be described in highly metaphorical ways, perhaps as being like the noise of a high-speed train carrying 
Charlie Parker and Jaco Pastorias from New Orleans to New York at the very moment when, passing 
over a bridge, it jumps its rails and ploughs head-on into the lines of gridlocked commuter traffic 
below. 
3 http://hollywoodrecords.go.com/tricky/index.html, 3 April 2003. 
4 This becomes especially apparent when one is able to observe her compositional method. Various 
documentaries and clips on the internet, for instance, have shown her walking along a beach or sitting 
at her laptop screaming and singing according to a properly improvisational compositional ideal that 
springs not from a preformed notion of what a song is to be but what it could become at any instant. 
5 It is important to stress that the individual and the strata of Capital cannot be unproblematically 
opposed to each other in a simple dualism as, respectively, internal and external, even if this 
terminology seems merely to echo Deleuze’s own vocabulary when he talks of the relationship 
between expressive qualities and their territory. The individual always retains a transversal relation to 
the social, political and economic field within which it is produced, it is always merely a folding of 
subjectification and hence only a partial object. Nonetheless, to think through this opposition in terms 
of internality and externality is useful inasmuch as it shows the extent to which the strata of Capital, 
positing itself as an outside to all production, can reproduce only stunted forms of subjectivity, 
reflections of the personological, familial, structural and institutional models that it favours, 
subjectivities whose internality is defined precisely by their externality.  
